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Cable Franchising and the First
Amendment: Preferred Problems,
Undesirable Solutions
by DANIEL L. BRENNER*
Introduction
The English language, thanks to the cable industry, has ad-
ded another definition to the word "overbuilding." The term
describes the act of a competitor constructing a cable system
over a territory already served by or franchised to another. For
example, a city may decide to issue more than one franchise to
a territory; a second operator might construct a system in unin-
corporated areas not under any franchising authority, but al-
ready served by a neighboring operator; or a private developer
could enter into an agreement with an operator to provide ser-
vice regardless of what the city has decided. In each of these
cases, an area is considered to have been overbuilt.'
Overbuilding, most often considered an economic or political
policy question,2 has potentially become a constitutional in-
quiry. Although invoking the label "nonexclusive,"3 municipal
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for its financial support and Paul Glist, Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Jonathan Varat,
and John Wiley for comments on earlier versions of this article.
1. The pressure for overbuilding is growing. One major factor is the continually
increasing disparity between the cost of building a cable system, around $500 per sub-
scriber for an overhead system, and the price of acquiring an existing system. Jack-
son, Cable and Public Utility Regulation, in UNNATURAL MONOPOLIES, THE CASE FOR
DEREGULATING PUBLIC UTILITIES 54 (R. Poole, Jr. ed. 1985). Purchase of an existing
system has climbed in the last three years from $1000 to $2800 per subscriber, depend-
ing on the location of the buyer and the economic profile of the system. See CABLEVI-
SION, Feb. 1, 1988, at 11.
2. For example, Illinois, Florida and Minnesota have laws, passed at the request
of incumbent operators, that require a competing second cable franchise to abide by
the same requirements as an existing operator. See MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Sept. 5,
1988, at 15; MULTICHANNEL NEWS, May 30, 1988, at 11.
3. Some states explicitly prohibit exclusive grants for any franchised activities,
see, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 440G-8 (1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4361 (West 1976);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 166A § 3 (West 1976); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 815 (McKinney
1982). In TM Cablevision of San Diego County v. Daon Corp., 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
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authorities generally grant only one franchise, through a com-
petitive bidding process.4 Three recent cases concluded that cit-
ies violated the first amendment rights of potential operators
when they granted only one franchise where wires for more
than one could have been accommodated on the poles and in
the ducts.5 The United States Supreme Court's 1986 decision in
City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc.,6 re-
viewing a fourth case, does not go quite so far. Preferred held
that operating a cable system "plainly implicate[s] First
Amendment interests."7 The Court ordered a trial to deter-
mine how substantial the City's reasons were for its exclusive
franchising policy. The results of that inquiry are to be used to
decide whether those interests outweigh the first amendment
rights of the overbuilder.
Cable operators enjoy first amendment protection, but denial
of a franchise for noncontent-related reasons does not violate
2576 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1981), California law was interpreted to preclude nominally exclu-
sive franchises. In Community Comms. Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982), the
Supreme Court held that cities could be held liable for antitrust violations in connec-
tion with the grant of a cable franchise unless immunized specifically by state law.
Some relief was subsequently provided by Congress in the Local Government Anti-
trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 34, 36 (Supp. III 1985), which bars money damages against cities
or their employees found to have violated antitrust laws in an official capacity.
4. The 1984 Cable Act does not specify the way in which a franchising authority
may select its operator(s), 47 U.S.C. § 541 (Supp. III 1985), but the intent was that
local franchising be the primary means of regulating cable television. Rollins
Cablevue, Inc. v. Saienni Enterprises, 633 F. Supp. 1315, 1318 (D. Del. 1986). The typi-
cal process involves a city issuing a Request for Proposals (RFP) indicating the terri-
tory and services (so far as permitted by the Cable Act) sought. Bids are received and
are typically reviewed and ranked by an outside consultant, whose report is then con-
sidered by the franchising authority, usually a city council. Applicants have been
known to load up ownership of their companies with persons who are considered in-
fluential or who occupy positions of community leadership to help differentiate their
applications from others. The process can range from relatively nonpartisan decision-
making to corrupt practices. See infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text. Officials
have attempted to divide territories among applicants, to the unlawful exclusion of
others. Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 700 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1983), off'd
en banc, 735 F.2d 1555 (5th Cir. 1984).
5. Cable television systems receive television and other signals by means of con-
ventional television antennae, microwave, and satellite dishes. Systems may also gen-
erate their own signals. All signals are collected at the system's headend, amplified,
downloaded to other frequencies, and fed into the system's distribution path. This
path must travel from the headend into the community over wires attached to utility
poles or cradled in underground ducts. From these wires, drop lines carry the signals
to the individual subscriber. See generally D. BRENNER & M. PRICE, CABLE TELEVI-
SION AND OTHER NONBROADCAST VIDEO: LAW AND POLICY § 1.03 (1988).
6. 476 U.S. 488 (1986), off'g on narrower grounds, 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985).
7. Id. at 494.
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that constitutional right since first amendment interests are
only weakly implicated in the franchising process.8 This is
largely due to the fact that proposed program content is not,
and may not be, a factor in the franchising decision.9 Preferred
does not reach this conclusion, nor does it contradict it. It calls
instead for a greater inquiry into the factual basis of a city's
policy, including an investigation of such indicia as traffic con-
gestion, disruption and esthetic blight caused by a second cable
operator, and economic demand for competing systems.
The Preferred case presents a novel problem of constitu-
tional adjudication. After examining the Preferred decisions,
this Article concludes that the Supreme Court's proposed ex-
amination is likely to yield an analytical dead-end. Offers of
proof are unlikely to lead to a decision about whether city in-
terests are sufficiently weighty, assuming there is a. first
amendment right to a franchise. Ultimately, the Court's deci-
sion offers a confusing, costly, and mostly useless direction for
resolving cable's first amendment status.
Of course, were an applicant's viewpoint or proposed pro-
gram content to enter into a franchising decision, the first
amendment would apply. Beyond this circumstance, however,
and in the absence of a shortage of alternatives for excluded
speakers, judicial resolution of cable franchising should focus
on the process's economic and predominantly nonspeech char-
acter. Franchise grants should be annulled for violations of due
process. Otherwise, the franchising process should be left to
the policies established by Congress in the 1984 Cable Commu-
nications Policy Act, which permits cities to grant one or more
franchises.' 0
8. See Brenner, Cable Television and the Freedom of Expression, 1988 DUKE L.J.
329.
9. 47 U.S.C. § 544(a) (Supp. III 1985) limits franchisor regulation to only those
activities specifically mentioned in the Act. Franchises in existence on or before De-
cember 29, 1984, the effective date of the Act, may be enforced as to their program
provisions. Id at § 544(c). This is subject to the operator's right to modify contained
in § 545. Franchises granted after the Act's effective date may not have specific re-
quirements for video programming, id. at § 544(b), but may indicate "broad categories
of video programming or other services," id. at § 544(b)(2)(B). Thus, a franchisor may
not make carriage of a particular network, program, or viewpoint a requirement of
the franchise, although categories such as "children's programming" or "news and
public affairs" can be specified. The execution of program decisions to meet such cate-
gories lies with the franchisee, however.
10. 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
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I
The Preferred Decisions
Preferred Communications, Inc. (PCI) wanted to operate a
cable system in the south-central district of Los Angeles. The
Los Angeles Municipal Code" prescribes a competitive bidding
process which leads to a single franchisee.12 Instead of partici-
pating in the bidding, PCI originally sought to lease space on
the poles and conduits of two public utilities in Los Angeles.'"
The utilities said that a franchise was required before leases
could be arranged. PCI petitioned for a franchise but, because
it had failed to participate in the auction, its petition was denied
by the City of Los Angeles. PCI sued the City, claiming the
denial violated its first amendment rights.'4
PCI claimed that a franchise-particularly, permits to use
conduits and poles-is the necessary passkey to the exercise of
its right as a first amendment speaker.15 PCI argued that be-
cause it might not choose to provide the same programming as
the auction winner, the City's denial of a second franchise
caused a loss of communication from the perspective of all par-
ties involved. This diminution in selection formed the basis of
its constitutional claim, although no particular program, net-
work, or point of view was identified as being potentially
excluded.
A. The Ninth Circuit Decision
The district court found as a matter of law that the City's
denial of a franchise did not violate PCI's first amendment
11. The Los Angeles ordinance, No. 58,200 (June 13, 1927), prescribes a competi-
tive bid procedure authorizing an award to the bidder offering "the highest percent-
age of gross annual receipts" or "such other ... consideration ... as may be prescribed
by the Council in the advertisement for bids and notice of sale."
12. The auction participant in Preferred was required to pay filing fees, provide a
detailed proposal of intended operations, demonstrate that it had both a sound finan-
cial base and business plan, and promise to provide a percentage of future annual
gross revenues, a 52-channel system, leased and public access channels, portable pro-
duction facilities, and other items detailed in the city's RFP. Preferred, 754 F.2d 1392,
1400-01 (9th Cir. 1985).
13. Preferred, 476 U.S. 488, 490 (1986).
14. PCI also claimed violations of federal antitrust laws, as well as various state
law violations. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of the anti-
trust claims and the state law claims were dismissed without prejudice for refiing in
state court. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1399 n.1.
15. Complaint of Plaintiff at 13, Preferred (C.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 1984) (No. 83-5846).
[Vol. 10:9991002
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rights and dismissed the complaint."l The U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit reversed "in an extremely muddled
opinion not helped much by heavy rewriting on petition for re-
hearing."'1 7 Describing the actual findings of the opinion is dif-
ficult, due in part to the case's procedural posture. The court of
appeals was bound to accept PCI's allegations as true as it was
reviewing the district court's motion to dismiss the complaint.
To affirm, the court had to conclude, beyond doubt, that the
plaintiff could show no set of facts that would entitle it to re-
lief.' As a result of the procedural nature of the review, the
appellate court was forced to identify whether some factual is-
sue might be subject to dispute.' 9 It identified physical scarcity
as the linchpin issue in question, suggesting that if PCI could
show that more than one system could be physically accommo-
dated, then an auction process violated its first amendment
rightsY
16. Id. This unreported decision is summarized in Franchising Litigation
Roundup, CABLE TV LAW REPORTER, Oct. 19,1984, at 2.
17. Preferred 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985). See Barnett, Franchising of Cable TV
Systems to Get Airing at Supreme Court, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 21,1986, at 42. C . L. PowE,
JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 243 (1987) (describing the
opinion as "scholarly" and "excellent"). Id. at 280.
18. 754 F.2d at 1399.
19. The court expressed its initial concern that the opinion that followed must
avoid drawing "the charge of rendering advisory opinions poorly disguised as sweep-
ing dicta." Id. at 1401. The court then seemed to do just what it warned against.
20. Id. This issue is repeated at the end of the court's first amendment discussion.
Id. at 1411. As the Supreme Court recognized, the Ninth Circuit was incorrect in
reducing the first amendment question to one factual matter.
The question arises whether the court meant by this ruling to forbid cities from
using methods other than the auction process to achieve exclusive franchising. For
instance, if the municipality decides to construct and operate a cable system itself,
would the first amendment be violated if space on the poles exists for a second one?
Further, if Los Angeles could not show that only one system could be physically ac-
commodated, then the city would have to "redesign... Its procedures relating to cable
television." Id. at 1401. Does this mean that PCI must be granted a franchise? It
seems to be the point of the case, but the language is vague enough to allow the city
considerable maneuverability. (The 1987 TELEVISION AND CABLE FACTBOOK, CABLE
& SERVICES VOLUME, includes the following types of cable system ownership and
these corresponding numbers of systems having that form of ownership: community
owned, 5; community owned and operated, 6; local investors, 10; local stockholders, 1;
municipally owned corporation, 1; municipally owned, 17; municipally owned and op-
erated, 39; nonprofit member association, 2; nonprofit community organization, 1;
nonprofit owned, 1; nonprofit co-operative, 4; nonprofit corporation, 6; nonprofit sub-
scriber owned, 8; nonprofit municipally owned and operated, 1; subscriber owned, 10;
subscriber owned and operated, 17; local shareholders, 4; and locally owned and oper-
ated, 2. (CABLE AND SERVICES] TELEVISION AND CABLE FACTBOOK 1987; Telephone
interview with Representative of Warren Publishing (Sept. 26, 1988)).
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Was this particular factual matter truly at issue? Probably
not. Los Angeles did not admit or deny the existence of physi-
cal capacity to accommodate more than one cable system, but
there was evidence suggesting that space for an additional line
was available.2 ' Indeed, the Supreme Court found that the City
admitted "the existence of excess physical capacity on the util-
ity poles, the rights-of-way and the like. '2 2 Thus, the factual
issue highlighted by the Ninth Circuit decision as decisive was
one the parties had not contested.
What was hotly debated was whether economic scarcity
could justify exclusive franchises and, more generally, whether
the City had an obligation to do more than state what it be-
lieved were substantial interests behind its policy. The City ar-
gued that cable is a natural monopoly in the territory under
consideration and that exclusive franchising is the best way to
deal with the entity that would occupy that monopoly position.
PCI maintained that competition for cable services is economi-
cally feasible. The Ninth Circuit ignored this factual issue in
setting up its linchpin question, although it refers to it as an
open issue elsewhere in the opinion.23
B. The Supreme Court Opinion
In affirming the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court found
that the questions of economic scarcity and the effects of physi-
cal scarcity were in factual dispute.24 The majority disregarded
the Ninth Circuit's first amendment theory, and a concurring
opinion emphasized that the decision left the standard for first
amendment challenges to a city's exclusive franchising policy
21. In its brief to the Supreme Court, the City of Los Angeles indicated that more
than one cable could be strung on the pole, since the City insisted that the issue was
not sufficient pole space. Brief for Petitioners at 38, Preferred, 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
Los Angeles appears to argue that, regardless of whether an additional operator could
be squeezed in, the City has a right to exercise discretion over such issues because
there may be competing claims for pole space in the future that may be more impor-
tant than use by a second cable operator.
22. Preferred, 476 U.S. at 493.
23. Preferred, 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985). The court states:
The City asserts next that, because cable televison is a natural monopoly,
economic scarcity justifies government regulation. We need not decide this
issue at this time. PCI's complaint alleges that competition for cable services
is economically feasible in the Los Angeles area. As we must accept this alle-
gation as true, we assume that no natural monopoly exists.
Id. at 1404. One is left wondering whether a city that could not show physical scarcity
but could show economic scarcity would still be barred from using an auction scheme.
24. 476 U.S. at 492-94.
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wide open.2
Instead, in a remarkably short opinion, the Supreme Court
expressed a desire for more information about other interests
advanced by the City to maintain an exclusive franchising
scheme.26 The Court identified the triable factual issues as: (1)
the visual blight created by installation and repair of the sys-
tems; (2) the traffic delays and hazards imposed by the systems;
and (3) the use that a cable operator makes of public property.'
The City's view was that these questions, along with the nat-
ural monopoly issue, were not triable matters. 2 It unsuccess-
fully argued that the factual bases for these asserted interests
need not be proven, even if experience shows it wrong, so long
as the City was reasonable in coming to them.-" The Court re-
jected this contention because the claims related to activities
that "plainly implicate First Amendment interests."'
C. Implications of the Court's Opinion
The Court's decision repudiates the Ninth Circuit's view that
an absence of physical scarcity on poles and conduits is enough
to nullify an auction approach to franchise licensing. However,
it subjects a city's decision to grant an exclusive franchise to a
factual scrutiny rather than leaving the matter as solely a ques-
tion of a city's policy preference. Cities may not decide unilat-
erally how much traffic inconvenience to bear, how much
visual blight to endure, or when a proposed competitive system
is too much of a burden to absorb. The Court could have found
that, whatever the weight of those interests, a city's good faith
judgment to proceed by exclusive licensing, without demon-
strating the factual basis for those judgments, was sufficient. It
considered but declined to accept this more deferential
standard.
31
The Court's acknowledgement of the first amendment's ap-
25. Id at 496-97 (Blackmun, Marshall, and O'Connor, J.J., concurring).
26. Id. at 495.
27. Id. at 493-94.
28. Brief for Petitioners at 43-45, Preferred, 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
29. Id.
30. 476 U.S. at 494.
31. Id. at 496. As support for a contrary proposition, the Court cites Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978), which held that a "lawyer's procurement of
remunerative employment is a subject only marginally affected with First Amend-
ment concerns. It falls within the State's proper sphere of economic and professional
regulation" to oversee such activities. 436 U.S. at 459.
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plication to cable television, without detailing how or whether
it applies to licensing,3 2 is understandable. The first amend-
ment should apply to cable speech in its role as editor or creator
of expression. 3 Given the "abstract posture" of the case, 4 the
recommendation of the Solicitor General to avoid broad pro-
nouncements, and the Court's evident desire to issue a ruling
before the end of its term,35 the Court properly avoided saying
more.se Further, given the Court's admitted lack of knowledge
about cable television, 7 the decision to overturn a motion to
dismiss, in an effort to gain more facts, was almost assured.
Questions remain as to what constitutes a sufficent showing
by a city to allow it to grant an exclusive franchise. Will a
strong showing of blight, but a less conclusive case of economic
monopoly result in a first amendment violation? How about
the reverse?
Although interest balancing is a principal tenet of constitu-
tional decision-making, ordering further fact-finding to estab-
lish the strength of governmental interests where the first
amendment is involved is a bit novel.so For example, the Court
32. "We do think that the activities in which respondent allegedly seeks to engage
plainly implicate First Amendment interests.... We do not think, however, that it is
desirable to express any more detailed views on the proper resolution of the First
Amendment question raised by the respondent's complaint and the City's responses
to it without a fuller development of the disputed issues in the case." Preferred, 476
U.S. at 494, 495.
33. Id. at 494. See Brenner, supra note 8, at 335-41.
34. "This constitutional question comes before the Court in an extremely abstract
posture." Brief of the United States and the Federal Communications Commission as
Amici Curiae Supporting Affirmance 12-13, Preferred, 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
35. The case was argued April 29, 1986 and decided June 2, 1986. The term ended
June 30, 1986.
36. The Court might have dismissed the petition for certiorari as improvidently
granted given how little it said. See, e.g., United States v. Quinn, 475 U.S. 791 (1986);
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Warren, 464 U.S. 988 (1983). However, by issuing an opinion
that gave no credence to the Ninth Circuit's first amendment analysis of the case, it
wiped clean the slate for lower courts and, ultimately, itself on the question.
37. "We think that we may know more than we know now about how the consti-
tutional issues should be resolved when we know more about the present uses of the
public utility poles and rights-of-way and how respondent proposes to install and
maintain its facilities on them." Preferred, 476 U.S. at 495. Also, the Court had little
in the way of useful judicial discussion of the case, given the sometimes confusing
Ninth Circuit opinion and the absence of a district court opinion. These factors may
explain why the Court's opinion is vague as to the exact issues it wished to have ex-
plored at trial.
38. This question differs from more routine fact-finding in the first amendment
context, e.g., jury review of allegedly obscene materials, truth or falsity in defamation
suits, or justifications for gag orders.
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did not require a showing of broadcast outlet scarcity in every
market in which the fairness doctrine operated, although it re-
lied upon spectrum scarcity as its rationale for upholding adop-
tion of the doctrine by the FCC. 9 Moreover, the Court
permitted the city of Renton to rely on the experiences of other
cities, rather than conduct its own factual investigation, when it
upheld a municipal ordinance limiting the permissible locations
of adult movie houses.40 For cable, however, a more searching
test is specified. Having little precedent to determine how
much evidence is required to substantiate or disprove a govern-
mental interest, and with no advice to follow on the degree of
protection to be afforded the franchising process, the parties in
Preferred and like cases face a standardless and costly eviden-
tiary exploration. 1
Moreover, casting the denial of a franchise as a violation of
the first amendment, absent evidence of intended viewpoint
discrimination, confuses the expressive and nonexpressive as-
pects of a cable operation.' Denial of a franchise, on its face,
does not preclude a party from saying or writing anything, or
the audience from receiving any particular message. If there
were insufficient alternatives for expression absent a franchise,
a denial might be unlawful.43 However, the Cable Act espe-
39. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
40. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). The Court held:
"The First Amendment does not require a city, before enacting such an ordinance, to
conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that already generated by
other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to
be relevant to the problem that the city addresses." Id at 51-52. The Court could have
directed the district court to adopt this standard. However, Los Angeles did not argue
that it was relying on the franchising experiences of other cities, although it noted
that "[n]early 7000 locations now wired for cable" acted as Los Angeles had. Brief for
Petitioner at 45, Preferred. 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
41. The high costs of discovery associated with vaguely defined issues is one prob-
lem. See Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Fffectiveness, Its Principal
Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 787 (1980).
42. Brenner, supra note 8, at 367-72.
43. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), established a four-part test to
determine when a government interest sufficiently justifies-the regulation of expres-
sive conduct-
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitu-
tional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the sup-
pression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest.
Id at 377. In practice, the O'Brien test is highly deferential to the government. See
Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 46,52 n.23 (1987). In cable, the
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cially provides for individual access for persons unaffiliated
with the operator, substantially reducing the impact of an ex-
clusive grant.44
Municipal franchising has not been the occasion for discrimi-
nation among applicants on the basis of viewpoint; there are no
reported cases of channel content being the basis for the grant
of a franchise to one party over another.45 But apart from first
excluded speaker can reach the cable audience through access provided for under the
Act. And, generally speaking, the first amendment interest of the audience in a di-
verse choice of cable services may be as well served by one operator as by several.
This is likely because the most popular cable services (e.g., CNN, ESPN) would likely
be carried by both in order to attract the preponderance of viewers. Also, excluded
services could use the leased access channels to program themselves directly to the
viewer. These arguments are more fully developed in a companion article. See Bren-
ner, supra note 8, at 370-71.
44. The Cable Act provides for access for individuals unaffiliated with the opera-
tor on a leased basis, 47 U.S.C. § 532 (Supp. III 1985), or, subject to franchise negotia-
tion, on an unpaid basis, id. at § 531. Even if access is not available, a court should
consider all other speech alternatives available to the excluded speaker before finding
that a franchise denial violates the first amendment. Were cable poles and ducts
deemed to be a public forum, the presumption would be that speech should be permit-
ted. There is no basis to conclude that these facilities should be the equivalent of
streets and parks, however. See Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Tax-
payers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984). The Ninth Circuit opinion in Preferred strug-
gles with the claim but fails to conclude that the poles and ducts amount to a public
forum. 754 F.2d at 1408-09. The underlying premise of public forum analysis is to
extend a presumption that the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech ap-
plies only to those sites which constitute public forums. In Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 447 U.S. 455 (1980), the Court attempted to break down the
concept into three categories: public property which has been devoted to speech activ-
ity; designated public forums which have been opened for use as a place for expressive
activity; and public property which by neither tradition nor designation is a forum for
communication (nonpublic forum). In addition, some private property which func-
tions as public property may be viewed as having the attributes of a public forum.
This private forum concept has developed in relation to private shopping centers.
Compare Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308
(1968) with Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) and Pruneyard Shopping Center v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
Professor Nimmer grouped the forum cases as either focusing on the speech-dedi-
cated attribute of a site or the incompatibility of the proposed expression with the site,
favoring the latter standard as more faithful to the aims of the first amendment. M.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4.09(D)(1)(a), at 4-74 (1984). But critical
to the forum concept under either formulation is a site at issue where expression can
occur, not mere transmission capacity. One might argue, in seeking access to a broad-
cast or cable channel, that such a facility is a public forum. But the transmission
capacity itself-the wires or the transmitter (or for that matter, the ink and paper
used by a newspaper)-is not the "forum." It may be that the "abstraction" of forum,
id. at 4-68, becomes too strained to be usefully applied to the problem of characteriz-
ing the first amendment character of exclusive franchises, at least as to transmission
capacity.
45. As Judge Posner stated in Omega Satellite Prods. v. City of Indianapolis, 694
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amendment objections, potential operators may have legitimate
objections to a noncompetitive franchising policy.
More likely, franchising problems involve corruption, real or
perceived, in the grant process. In Pacific West Cable Co. v.
City of Sacramento,46 one of the cases finding that a municipal-
ity's exclusive licensing policy violated the first amendment,
the jury found that the city and county had used their exclusive
licensing policy "as a pretext to obtain cash payments, in kind
services and increased campaign contributions. 47 The Pacfc
West case illustrates the "rent-a-citizen" approach taken in sev-
eral franchising battles, offering equity or consultant arrange-
ments to prominent community leaders in a cable franchise
application for use of their names. Indeed, it is difficult to con-
clude that the jury verdict in the Pacfiw West case had much to
do with the freedom of expression-the jury reached no verdict
on whether suppression of viewpoint was involved.48 Instead,
the case illustrates jury antipathy toward a process fatally in-
fected with favoritism.49 Beyond favoritism, cable franchising
has seen more serious proof of corruption. 5° Given the finan-
cial stakes involved, close scrutiny of franchising is appropri-
ate.5 ' The proper remedy for such abuses is to find a violation
F.2d 119, 128 (7th Cir. 1982), in reviewing a first amendment and antitrust attack on
an exclusive franchise grant: "The City of Indianapolis could not deny a franchise to
Omega because Omega carried programs critical of the Republican Party. Nothing of
that sort is alleged, though."
46. 672 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D. Cal. 1987).
47. Id. at 1338.
48. Id. at 1342-43. The only speech-related special verdict answered in plaintiff's
favor (in the negative), "Have defendants left open ample alternative channels of
communication for plaintiff, and persons like plaintiff, who wish to express their
views?," id. at 1343, would seem to prove too much. Read literally, anyone who did
not possess a cable franchise would lack ample alternative communication channels.
The court did not emphasize this verdict in its discussion of the first amendment is-
sues in the case. I& at 1331-39.
49. In response to the jury's verdict, the City established a five-year license plan
for all applicants. One observer stated: "[The jury might have perceived a 'political
fix' based on evidence of increased campaign contributions by cable bidders to city
council members and local politicians running for office." CABLE TV L. REP., July 16,
1987, at 3. The forewoman of the six member jury was reported as stating that the
jury made its decision primarily because of the role played by a group of investors of
prominent Sacramentans (the "Gang of 73") who had invested in the winning
franchise bid ("We felt the whole thing was written up to exclude competition and it
had to do with this Gang of 73--and they got their share."). Sacramento Bee, July 19,
1987, at 1, col. 1.
50. MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Oct. 19, 1987, at 49 (two New York City officials con-
victed of bribes related to cable franchises).
51. Of course, putting the city through a fact-finding process may not lead to the
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of due process rights or state anti-corruption statutes. Trials on
these matters are appropriate.
It was, however, the first amendment, and not corruption,
that formed the basis for the Court's insistence on a further
factual showing in Preferred.52 Even supposing that a less def-
erential standard of constitutional review applies to exclusive
franchising than the one proposed here,53 Preferred's solution
requires evidentiary presentations likely to lead to highly sub-
jective or arbitrary findings of fact.
II
The Balancing Factors Identified in Preferred
The Preferred decision identified visual and esthetic blight,
traffic delays and hazards, economic scarcity, and disruption of
rights-of-way as state interests worthy of factual considera-
tion.m As shown below, parties are likely to have a difficult
time making a convincing showing in any of these areas.
A. Esthetic Blight and Traffic Delays
In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,5 5 the Supreme
Court faced a city ordinance banning outdoor billboards except
on-site commercial advertising. The City had claimed that the
ban was "to eliminate hazards to pedestrians and motorists
brought about by distracting sign displays" and "to preserve
and improve the appearance of the City. ' A plurality of the
Court held that the ordinance was unconstitutional on its face
because it discriminated between commercial and noncommer-
cial on-site advertising.57
The Court did not require an evidentiary showing as to
whether the statute did, in fact, sufficiently "directly ad-
discovery of misconduct in the grant process. It is quite possible that the community
where the best case for exclusive franchising exists may also be the place where the
process is apt to be most corrupted. And whatever the wisdom of the harder factual
look required by the Supreme Court in Preferred, the Court did not predicate its re-
mand because of the opportunity for corruption in franchising.
52. 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986).
53. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
54. 476 U.S. at 493.
55. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
56. Id. at 493.
57. Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined in the opinion, concluding that the
ordinance, which they subjected to somewhat stricter scrutiny, impermissibly banned
all billboards without sufficient justification. Id. at 521-22.
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vance" the government's interest in traffic safety or in the ap-
pearance of the city. Indicating that there was a "meager
record"59 on the traffic question, the Court applied a reasonable
relation test.' Similarly, it recognized that "esthetic judg-
ments are necessarily subjective, defying objective evaluation,
and for that reason must be carefully scrutinized to determine
if they are only a public rationalization of an impermissible
purpose."'" Even so, without more than the City's asserted
views and the absence of an ulterior motive, the Court con-
cluded: "It is not speculative to recognize that billboards by
their very nature and wherever located and however con-
structed, can be perceived as an 'esthetic harm.' "62
The Supreme Court's Preferred decision implicitly rejected
this highly deferential approach for municipal claims as to es-
thetic and traffic matters in multiple cable installations. The
Court may have been correct in not applying the low level of
scrutiny used in Metromedia. For instance, the Court may be
expected to know more about billboards, long a part of the U.S.
landscape, than the varying esthetic and construction charac-
teristics of cable installation.
Further, traffic delays caused by a second cable operator are
not self-evident. The intrusiveness caused by the second opera-
tor could be significantly mitigated by requiring both competi-
58. This criterion was one of four established for commercial speech regulation in
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-66 (1980),
and which in word, if not application, is reminiscent of the O'Brien standard. 391 U.S.
at 376-77; see supra note 43. In Central Hudson, the New York state public service
commission banned public utility advertising which promoted the use of electricity
because it was contrary to the national policy of conserving energy. The Court invali-
dated the regulation, setting forth a test for commercial speech that asks whether the
expression concerns lawful activity and is not misleading;, whether the asserted gov-
ernment interest is substantial; whether the regulation directly advances the govern-
mental interest asserted; and whether it is not more extensive than necessary to serve
that interest. 447 U.S. at 566.
59. 453 U.S. at 508.
60. Id at 508-09.
61. 1& at 510.
62. 1d Nor was a more searching analysis made of the esthetic claims in Members
of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984). The
case was decided on cross-motions for summary judgment after discovery, and the
district court judge determined that the illegally posted signs on telephone poles
"'constitute[d] a clutter and visual blight,"' 466 U.S. at 794 (quoting district court
opinion). The Court did not address the significance of the esthetic blight. Id. at 802.
Rather, the issue was whether the interest in eliminating visual blight was suffi-
ciently weighty to justify the ban on such posters. I& In Preferred, the Court seemed
to accept that the question of blight was unanswered.
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tors to lay cable at the same time. Since the City was willing to
endure any cable construction, the added burden of the second
operator seems minor. Second, even in competitive builds
there is not necessarily overlapping construction; instead, com-
petitors race to be first, not to overbuild. 3
Cities allow frequent disruptions for other types of building
activities." Imposing less restrictive alternatives to outright
bans, such as requiring overbuilders to pay compensation to a
city for special disruption due to nonsimultaneous construction,
is one viable alternative. Such penalties may also deter alleged
line-cutting of the incumbent system by overbuilders 5
Arguably, greater esthetic blight will be caused by unregu-
lated billboards than by a second overhead cable. Given ex-
isting cables, one cable, more or less, is difficult to see as
determinative of blight. For underground installations there is
no evident blight from the wires. Conversely, there can be ex-
tensive (even if reparable) damage and blight to individual
property owners who will be required to allow a second fran-
chisee to cross lawns, driveways, and other private property to
install a system. Large pedestal boxes may also be needed for
below-ground builds, and the appearance of more than one
such box at or near private property may constitute an eye-sore
for property owners, who may not wish to subscribe to any
cable service.6
63. In Phoenix, Ariz., where systems were allowed to compete openly in the late
1970's, competitors would not build on the same street. "[I]f one company started
digging in one direction... the next company dug in the other." Sacramento Bee,
July 19, 1987, § B, at 4, col. 4.
64. L. PowE, JR., supra note 17, at 280 n.42: "Given the existing problems of
sewer repair, road construction, and new building, I believe that the traffic disruption
most municipalities allow will guarantee cable entry."
65. Cablevision of Cent. Fla., Inc. v. Telesat Cablevision, Inc., No. 86-16434 (Or-
ange Co. Cir. Ct. 1986) (incumbent obtained preliminary injunction against cable cuts
by overbuilder, who was subsequently given "strong judicial warning" to stop inter-
fering with incumbent's equipment); Dynamic Cablevision of Fla., Inc. v. Telesat
Cablevision, Inc. (Dade Co. Cir. Ct. 1987) (complaint alleged line-cutting); W.B. Cable
Assocs., Ltd. v. Telesat Cablevision, Inc., No. CL-87-1139 (Palm Beach Co. Cir. Ct.
1987) (complaint alleged line-cutting); see Letter of Stephen R. Ross, Chief, FCC
Cable Television Branch, to M. Tauber, No. 4410-RP (Nov. 6, 1987) (investigating
claim of wire cut by overbuilder leading to signal leakage).
66. The Brief for Petitioners in Preferred characterized the blight problem this
way:
When cable is installed in trenches along a right-of-way that crosses private
property... [t]rees, shrubs, fences, and lawns must be cut or displaced. If
two cables are laid simultaneously, a larger trench is needed. If they are laid
at different times a second trench is necessary to avoid disturbing the first
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Presumably, triers of fact will be required to make these
judgment calls as to traffic and blight. It may be hard for either
party to make an overwhelmingly convincing claim on either
issue. A case can be made, of course, that two operators are a
greater burden than one, that two cables are more unsightly
than one, and that traffic will be congested more often with
more than one cable.
These conclusions are destined to be subjective and specula-
tive. It is not evident what legal significance should attach to a
showing of "some" blight, as opposed to "substantial" blight, or
"some," but not "substantial" disruption. And it is unclear
what a jury's finding of "some" blight and disruption actually
means. A court inclined to view cable system construction as a
first amendment activity will minimize the finding. A court
viewing cable system construction as a nonspeech-related en-
terprise may find a city's case availing. In either event, the evi-
dentiary showing, replete with photos of dangling wires and
maps revealing wires carefully cradled in underground ducts,
will add little.
Where the first amendment is concerned, the Court has
rightfully been reluctant to attach too much weight to the visu-
ally upsetting, 7 and the Preferred decision indicates factual
records were desirable on these stated government interests.
But has much been gained by this declaration? The fate of ex-
cluded cable operators, vis-a-vis the first amendment, seems to
hang in the balance, given the Preferred formulation, yet the
subjectivity of these matters makes a trial unlikely to yield
more insight as to their substantiality than does the good-faith
assertion by a city of their existence.'
B. Cable as Natural Monopoly
Both Preferred decisions accept, as a triable issue of fact,
cable (often laid in concrete). And since the amplifiers and taps are not bur-
ied, they must be put up on pedestals at intervals.
Brief for Petitioners at 23, Preferred, 476 U.S. 488 (1986). A residence is not required
to subscribe to cable or to maintain a subscription, although the apparatus will remain
in place.
67. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983); Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
205 (1975); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). But see City of Lakewood v. Plain
Dealer Publishing Co., 108 S. Ct. 2138, 2155 n.6 (1988) (White, J., dissenting) (discuss-
ing first amendment characterization of newsrack placement ban).
68. The Court has been more willing to accept the unempirical judgment of cities
in the related context of zoning ordinances. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416
U.S. 1 (1974) (restricting dwelling units to those occupied by a single family).
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PCI's assertion that competition for cable service is economi-
cally feasible in the Los Angeles area.69 Neither opinion articu-
lated what factual showing is necessary to demonstate that
economically feasible competition is possible. The Ninth Cir-
cuit acknowledged, but rejected, the City's claim that, as a mat-
ter of law, the natural monopoly characteristics of cable
preclude feasible economic competition.7"
1. Definition of Natural Monopoly
The definition of natural monopoly is elusive. Even those
who have studied the cable television industry specifically fail
to define measures to use to determine whether competition is
feasible.7 ' One theory suggesting that cable exists as a natural
monopoly argues that franchises which allow only one system
to serve the market at a time are efficient because a second sys-
tem built alongside the first is a wasteful duplication of re-
sources.72 Competing economic theories of natural monopoly
are considerably more complex.
A market defined as a natural monopoly lies at the opposite
end of the spectrum from the theoretical ideal market state of
"perfect" competition.73 In the idealized market, buyers and
69. 476 U.S. 488, 492 (1986); 754 F.2d 1396, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1985).
70. Several courts have opined that cable television may be considered a natural
monopoly. See, e.g., Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 1555, 1563
(5th Cir. 1984); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370,
1379 (10th Cir. 1981), cert di.smissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982); Berkshire Cablevision of
Rhode Island, 571 F. Supp. 956, 985-86; Hopkinsville Cable TV, Inc. v. Pennroyal
Cablevision, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 543, 547 (W.D. Ky. 1982). Three district courts have
tried the question: see Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 610
F. Supp. 891 (W.D. Mo. 1985), off'd, 800 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct.
1358 (1987) (natural monopoly found); Pacific West Cable Co. v. City of Sacramento,
672 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D. Cal. 1987) (no natural monopoly found); Nor-West Cable Com-
munications Partnership v. City of St. Paul, 3-83 Civ. 1228 (D. Minn. June 10, 1988)
(natural monopoly found), reported in CABLE TV L. RPTR. June 30, 1988, at 3-5. The
first two cases involved misconduct that might have influenced the outcomes; in the
first instance by the incumbent franchisee, in the latter, by the franchisor. See infra
note 151.
71. See infra notes 73-146 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, 610 F. Supp. at
899-900.
73. "Natural monopoly" originated in the writings of John Stuart Mill. 2 J.S.
MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (J. Robson rev. ed. 1965)(7th ed. 1871). Mill
drew upon his views of the competitive markets for gas and water supply in London in
the eighteenth century. Mill suggested that significant economies would result if only
one firm existed in these markets. A sole provider would experience increasing reve-
nues with declining marginal costs. The rate of profit, which would otherwise in-
crease, would be controlled by regulating, in fact lowering, the prices charged for the
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sellers are so numerous that no single actor can set a market
price by individual conduct. There are no barriers to new firms
entering the market and all participants have equal knowledge
of market conditions. In this type of market, buyers differenti-
ate among sellers based solely on the price of the goods offered.
In this market, price equals cost: Consumers pay the cost of
goods rather than remitting a supranormal profit to the seller
who acts as a price taker, taking the price as given by outside
forces.
74
These conditions prevent a seller from raising its price above
anyone else's because alternative sources are ready to satisfy
buyer demand at lower cost.75 Markets close to the competitive
model cause greater efficiency in the use and allocation of re-
sources and the development of more efficient techniques and
improved products and services.
76
In a natural monopoly, production technology exhibits de-
clining marginal costs. Broadly speaking, the bigger a firm
gets, the lower its cost-based price, to a point.77 The monopoly
is "natural" in the sense that, over time, the big firm, harnes-
sing the power of the production technology, drives out smaller
ones. The cost characteristics of the technology make competi-
tion nonsustainable. 8
Most markets lie between the two extremes. Several factors
determine whether a market is "workably" competitive.79 The
service so that the average cost returned only a low rate of return to the monopolist.
In this way, the regulated natural monopolist, and not competition, best advances con-
sumer welfare. Id at 405-10, 468-69. See also Giddings, The Persistence of Competi-
tion, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 62 (1887).
74. A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE & PRODUCTION, COMPETITION, COORDI-
NATION & CONTROL 205 (3d ed. 1983).
75. H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 1.1, at 2 (1985).
76. For these reasons competition is favored in the antitrust laws. 2 P. AREEDA &
D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw § 401, at 267-68 (1978).
77. See A. ALCHAIN & W. ALLEN, supra note 74, at 275 (citing example of automo-
bile industry); Lowry, Justification for Regulation: The Case for Natural Monopoly,
92 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 17 (1973).
78. See generally W. BAUMOL, J. PANZER & R. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS
AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982).
79. See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY
THE ANTITRUST LAWS (1955) (identifying ten factors to determine if a market is
"workably" competitive: (1) number of effective competitive sellers; (2) opportunity
for entry; (3) independence of rivals; (4) predatory preclusive practices; (5) rate of
growth of the industry or market; (6) character of market incentives to competitive
moves; (7) product differentiation and product homogeneity; (8) meeting or matching
the prices or rivals; (9) excess capacity; and (10) price discrimination). Id. at pt. 8, 324-
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theory of natural monopoly is based on the premise that some
markets will never be workably competitive. Government reg-
ulation of these markets, based on an acceptance of that inevi-
tability and fear of the intervening "ruinous" competition, is,
according to this viewpoint, the wiser course.
This philosophy, taken to its extreme, would lead to a state-
controlled economy and a repudiation of the role that competi-
tion can play in lowering prices and improving services." A
free enterprise system relies on the allocative efficiency that
competition induces and a recognition of the "persistence of
competition."' Buyers desire competition and would-be mar-
ket entrants want to offer it. Designating a market a natural
monopoly must be done carefully because it triggers forfeiture
of competition's benefits.8 2
80. Two major industries moving from a regulated to competitive arrangement,
airlines and trucking, have shown the benefits of competition in lowering prices and
expanding choice of carrier. See S. MORRISON & C. WINSTON, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS
OF AIRLINE DEREGULATION 72 (1986); Moore, Trucking and Rail Regulation in REGU-
LATORY REFORM: A POST MORTUM (L. Weiss & M. Klass 1986); Moore, U.S. Airline
Deregulation: Its Effects on Passengers, Capital, and Labor, 29 J.L. & EcON. 1, 27-28
(1986). The deregulation of cable television itself involved removing unnecessary re-
strictions on program sources and rate flexibility and can be seen as a further exam-
ple of the force of competition on an otherwise regulated environment. See Besen &
Crandall, The Deregulation of Cable Television, 44 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77 (1981).
81. See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 75 and accompanying text; Giddings, supra
note 73, at 66; Hazlett, The Curious Evolution of Natural Monopoly Theory, in UNNAT-
URAL MONOPOLIES, THE CASE FOR DEREGULATING PUBLIC UTILITIES 3 (R. Poole, Jr.
ed. 1985).
82. In the cable context, it may mean loss of competition for roughly equivalent
program service offerings, less costly program packages based on fewer channel offer-
ings, and the potential for some loss of program choice, although access schemes mini-
mize some of that risk. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
The advantage of price competition may in fact be at odds with the goal of greater
program diversity. Say a cable franchisee provides 52 channels as its basic offering,
doing so as a result of an RFP aimed at providing the city with a relatively "state of
the art" system. The broader mix of services comes at a lower cost per subscriber
because the specialty channels are offered to all subscribers, in much the way that
sections of newspaper may not be read by each subscriber but all sections presumably
appeal to at least some subscribers and it is more efficient to send the entire paper to
all readers. There may be some customers who would prefer a stripped down package
at a lower cost (e.g., customers who subscribe to cable primarily for enhanced broad-
cast signal reception). The first amendment goal of more choice to the public, which
is part of PCI's argument, ironically favors the sole franchisee with the broader pro-
gram selection over an overbuilder who wants to give the cheaper, smaller package.
The overbuilder is arguing for competition, in this instance, not for some diversity-
enhancing reason but because it can provide the product some consumers want at a
lower price. The franchisee, having built the system with the city's expectations in
mind and hoping to spread the cost of a 52-channel basic offering across its entire
subscriber base, may be unable to compete with the overbuilder head to head on the
1988] CABLE FRANCHISING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1017
The theory of natural monopoly has looked to economies of
scale as the test of its existence.83 A business that possesses
substantial fixed costs will, if allowed to control the market,
experience declining average costs, reflecting the economies of
scale. The theory of a government controlled natural monop-
oly is that the benefit of lower average costs, through regula-
tion, is passed along to the consumer.8
Even this general description leads to disagreement among
economists about determining the presence of a natural monop-
oly in a specific market. Critics have effectively shown that
scale economies are neither necessary nor sufficient to identify
a natural monopoly.85 Further, a natural monopoly can exist
under increasing cost conditions 8
Some commentators have suggested that focusing on econo-
mies of scale is wrong. Instead, a given market is examined to
see if it is "contestable. '87 Even where scale economies exist, a
market may still be contestable in that the threat of entry by a
competitor into the market may cause a natural monopoly to
behave competitively." A firm may hold a de facto monopoly, 9
but it is always threatened by the entry of others.
Contestable markets, however, require either low entry bar-
riers or low exit barriers or both. Otherwise, a would-be com-
petitor poses no threat to the de facto monopolist.90 Because
scaled-down offering. This situation can be compared to the development of discount
video or book stores which offer fewer and more popular titles at substantial dis-
counts. Of course, there is no franchise requirement to open a bookstore, and, con-
versely, bookstores make no demands for rights-of-way.
83. See W. SHARKEY, THE THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY 15-16 (1982); Hazlett,
Private Monopoly and the Public Interest An Economic Analysis of the Cable Televi-
sion Franchise, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1335, 1340 (1986).
84. See Hotelling, The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation and
Utility Rates, 6 ECONOMETRICA 242 (1938).
85. J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 12 (1961); Posner, Natu-
ral Monopoly and its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548 (1969).
86. B. MITNICK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION 297 (1980).
87. See Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55 (1968). But see
Telser, On the Regulation of Industry: A Note, 77 J. POL. ECON. 937, 938-39 (1969);
Williamson, Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies - In General and with Re-
spect to CATV, 7 BELL J. ECON. 73, 77-78 (1976).
88. Hazlett, supra note 83, at 1341; Bailey, Contestability and the Design of Regu-
latory and Antitrust Policy, 71 AM. ECON. REv. 178, 178-80 (1981).
89. By de facto monopoly, it is meant that the operator is the sole provider of
cable service, even though it is not considered to be a monopoly by the franchising
authority. See supra note 3.
90. In determining barriers to entry, one focuses on sunk costs, the cost of assets
which can be used only in one market, instead of fixed costs. Coursey, Isaac, Luke &
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cable television operation is characterized by high sunk costs9 '
that act as a barrier to entry and exit, 2 it would be hard to
describe it as contestable.93
Another definition of natural monopoly looks to whether
lower costs are obtained if there is only one producer in the
market." A natural monopoly is said to exist where cost condi-
tions are subadditive, that is, "if and only if a single firm can
produce the desired output at lower cost than any combination
of two or more firms."95 Thus, subadditivity exists where direct
competition involves "unbearably great inefficiencies ' *' and
regulation is appropriate.9
Subadditive conditions may be brought about by cable sys-
tems. For example, one study estimates that a single cable firm
Smith, Market Contestability in the Presence of Sunk (Entry) Costs, 15 RAND J. ECON.
69, 70-71 (1984). The difference in these types of costs is illustrated by deregulation in
the airline industry. H. HOVENKAM, supra note 75, § 1.5, at 35-36; Brodley, Antitrust
Policy Under Deregulation- Airline Mergers and the Theory of Contestable Markets,
61 B.U.L. REV. 823 (1981). Under regulation, it was the accepted view that a particular
route, say between Sacramento and Minneapolis, could support only a single supplier.
Id at 824-25. Rate regulation under natural monopoly theory was indicated. Under a
competitive model, if the sole incumbent firm reduces the number of flights and
raises prices to those consistent with monopoly behavior, a new airline may enter and
undercut. This behavior is possible because the principal cost factor of serving the
route is controlled by the expense of purchasing an airplane. The price of the plane is
fixed, but because the plane can be used to service other routes if the incumbent
makes competition no longer desirable, it is not a sunk cost. Having restored competi-
tion, the entrant can pocket its short-term gains, exit the market, and operate else-
where. Because the fixed cost of the airplane is not sunk, but is salvageable, it is
unnecessary to prohibit potential entry because of natural monopoly; the market is
contestable. Id at 833-35.
91. Id.
92. See Comment, Regulating Cable Television: Quincy Cable's Unnatural Ap-
proach to Cable's Natural Monopoly, 31 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 591, 633-34 (1986). On the
other hand, near-substitutes like multichannel multipoint distribution systems
(MMDS) with lower sunk costs point in the direction of contestability. See D. BREN-
NER & M. PRIcE, supra note 5, at § 16.041l][b]. MMDS requires line of sight from the
transmitter but none of the expensive wiring of cable television.
93. Posner argues that plant and equipment could be sold to a successor firm at
the original cost less depreciation. Posner, The Appropriate Scope of Regulation in
the Cable Television Industry, 3 BELL J. ECON. 98, 116 (1972). Williamson points out
that such transfers involve complicated transaction costs of valuating the property.
Williamson, supra note 87, at 85-88.
94. W. SHARKEY, supra note 83, at 54. See also Baumol, On the Proper Tests for
Natural Monopoly in a Multiproduct Industry, 67 AM. ECON. REv. 809 (1977).
95. W. SHARKEY, supra note 83, at 54.
96. 2 A. KAHN, THE EcoNoMIcs OF REGULATION 118-19 (1971).
97. Even then, the costs of regulation might outweigh the harms of inefficiency.
This is the view of Professor Hazlett, see Hazlett, supra note 83, at 1340-64. See also
Webbink, Should Cable TV be Regulated As a Public Utility?, 89 PuB. UTiL. FORT. 32,
33-34 (1972).
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with 30,000 subscribers would incur an average cost per sub-
scriber about eighteen percent lower than two overbuilt firms
with 15,000 subscribers each." The authors of this study, how-
ever, note that this eighteen percent lies in the range of mark-
ups one might expect without competition or effective
regulation. Thus, competition might still be preferable to a mo-
nopoly, despite the cost penalty from lost scale economies. Two
other studies report costs up to twenty-eight percent higher to
cable customers if two franchises rather than one are issued.,,
Others have found that, putting aside competition by telephone
companies, cable possesses the economies of scale characteris-
tics of a natural monopoly.10
On the other hand, some studies have found that competition
is feasible within certain so called "cherry-picked,"''1 1 or prime,
areas but is unworkable system-wide. 02 Thus, overbuilding
may only make sense in selected zones of a franchise territory
and will not otherwise be likely to bring about a return on in-
98. Owen & Greenhalgh. Competitive Considerations in Cable Television
Franchising, 4 CONTEMP. POL'Y ISSUES 69, 76 (1986).
99. Hazlett, The Policy Qf Eclusive Franchising in Cable Television, 31 J. BROAD-
CASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 1, 5 (1987) discusses unpublished studies by the ac-
counting firm of Touche, Ross & Co. One study, prepared for the City and County of
Sacramento, forecasted costs 23.9% higher than in a monopoly situation. A second
study, prepared for the city of Denver, projected higher costs of between 23% and 28%
if two rather than one operator was in place. Touche, Ross & Co., Financial and Eco-
nomic Analysis of the Cable Television Permit Policy of the City and County of Den-
ver (1984). For a critique, see Hazlett, supra, at 5; Hazlett, supra note 83, at 1363
n.100; but see Nadel, CableSpeech for Whom?, 4 CARDozo ARTs & ENT. L.J. 51, 62
(1985).
100. Noam, Local Distribution Monopolies in Cable Television and Telephone Ser-
vice: The Scope for Competition, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS TODAY AND TOMORROW
358-59 (E. Noam ed. 1983). Noam declines to conclude that cable television is a natural
monopoly and urges that phone companies be allowed to compete wherever there is a
well-established cable operator. 1d 376-77. An unpublished study by Paul Bortz, in-
troduced into evidence in the St. Paul overbuilding suit, prepared for Continental
Cablevision, see irfra note 151, indicated that "competition isn't feasible in any top-30
market." CABLE TV L. RPTR., June 30, 1988, at 5.
101. "Cherry-picking" refer to the practice of selective wiring of high density ar-
eas or areas which, based on other marketing characteristics such as residential in-
come, are expected to lead to higher penetration rates per mile wired.
102. Touche Ross & Co., Metro-Dade Report on Overlapping Cable Franchise
Study 44-45 (Oct. 7, 1987). In the cherry-picked area of 6,500 homes, half were as-
sumed to go to the overbuilder. Over ten years, the loss to the existing operator
would be $2.3 million, while the overbuilder would show a gain of $200,000. IM at 33-
34. A 1987 Malarkey-Taylor Associates study found a full overbuild to be uneconomic
in St. John's County, Florida. Malarkey-Taylor Assocs., Economic Analysis of An
Overbuild in St. John's County, Fla. (July 24, 1987).
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vestment that is reasonable in light of the risk involved." s
Thus, while these studies suggest subadditivity in cost condi-
tions under competition, they do not resolve whether exclusive
franchising is preferable. First, they assume that cherry-pick-
ing of denser areas cannot or should not occur. While the Cable
Act forbids the exclusion of cable service based on income,"° it
does not require a city to insure that all of its areas are wired.' 5
Even studies that suggest that overbuilding is generally uneco-
nomic in the long run do not eliminate the possibility of viable
overbuilding in cherry-picked areas. 106
Additionally, the evidence indicates that while overbuilding
is generally not profitable or sustainable, it has persisted in a
few places it has been permitted. Allentown, Pennsylvania has
had twenty years of some head-to-head competition, although it
has been argued that each of the systems there subsidizes losses
by drawing on profits from exclusive franchises in neighboring
municipalities. 107 Allentown is joined by other communities
where there is some overbuilding due to multiple franchising of
the same territory.1 08
103. Book, Do Overbuilds Make Sense?, CABLE MARKETING, Nov. 1987, at 34.
104. 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(3) (Supp. III 1985).
105. ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1580 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
106. Book, supra note 103, at 36. "In sum, there are situations where full-system
overbuilds may work and may be in the best interest of consumers, but we believe
such cases are few and far between." Id
107. Comment, supra note 92, at 628. In Allentown, Eli Noam has pointed out that
subscriber rates "are above the national average." Noam, Economies of Scale in Cable
Television: A Multipart Analysis, in VIDEO MEDIA COMPETITION: REGULATION, ECO-
NOMICS, AND TECHNOLOGY 114 (E. Noam ed. 1985). There are some parts of Allentown
in which a viewer can choose between two companies, although other areas are served
by only one provider. Interview with Sylvia Lawler, Television Editor of the Allen-
town, Pa. Morning Call (Aug. 13, 1987). An additional reason for Allentown's heavy
cable concentration may lie in the fact that Allentown and the Lehigh Valley are
considered part of the Philadelphia market for television purposes but have a clear
identity as both a newspaper and radio market separate from Philadelphia. Was Al-
lentown considered a separate market, a station assigned to it might have been able to
acquire a network affiliation and the need to import network signals from Philadel-
phia or New York would have been less signficant, reducing the importance of cable.
See Morning Call (Allentown), Mar. 17, 1986, § D, at 1.
108. See Hazlett, supra note 83, at 1373, citing direct competition in Chapman,
Kan., Colorado Springs, Colo., and Niceville, Fla. Competition ended in Chapman in
mid-1987 when the city revoked one of the two competing franchises for failure to
abide by its terms; the revocation was not challenged in court. Telephone interview
with Marietta Lucas, Chapman City Clerk (Aug. 17, 1988).
Colorado Springs maintains some head-to-head competition over a portion of the
city although other areas are served by only one of two operators. Telephone inter-
view with Colorado Springs City Clerk's Office (Aug. 17, 1988).
There is no competition in Niceville. A 1985 referendum recommended that the
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A 1982 study conducted for Monroe, Georgia, surveyed
ninety-three communities where multiple franchising oc-
curred, including twenty-four cities that chose to allow head-to-
head competition.1°9 Consolidation by one of the competitors of
the other occurred in fourteen of the twenty-four cities al-
lowing direct competition. 110 In six others, competitors carved
up the territory, granting each other de facto exclusivity."'
The remaining four franchises continued as direct overbuilds.
One study of the data showed that, of the ninety-three commu-
nities, fifty-one "exhibited varying degrees of direct com-
petition."' 12
A 1986 Department of Justice study examined the factors
that lead to the viability of overbuilds."' As one might expect,
the extent and effects of overbuilding are "highly sensitive to
local market conditions and to the rules governing market en-
try."114 Successful overbuilding is more likely to occur when all
competitors enter the market simultaneously and there is high
demand for cable service. Still, the study described the welfare
effects of competition as "ambiguous.""
15
Further, there are sometimes substantial costs of regulation
attached to a noncompetitive model that are avoided by licens-
ing everyone who meets minimum qualifications."6 Open li-
censing leaves to the marketplace the task of sorting out
whether one or more operators will survive." 7 Additionally,
city construct a cable system to compete with the existing operator but the system has
not been built. Telephone interview with George Ireland, Niceville City Clerk (Aug.
18, 1988).
109. A. PEARCE, R. PETERSON & M. FREDERICKSON, COMPEITIVE CABLE
FRANCHISING: ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC THEORY AND EMPmCAL DATA 43 (1983) [here-
inafter A. PEARCE]. For a different interpretation of the data, see Hazlett, supra note
83, at 1373-74.
110. A. PEARCF, supra note 109.
111. Id. at 19.
112. Hazlett, supra note 83, at 1374.
113. ANTrrRusT DIVISION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, PuB. No. EAG 86-9, Economic
Policy Office Discussion Paper (1986) (hereinafter Discussion Paper].
114. Id at 34.
115. Id
116. After an adverse finding in its exclusive licensing case, see supra notes 46-49
and accompanying text, the City of Sacramento enacted an ordinance allowing new
cable operators into the market with only minimal regulations, allowing "for over-
builds that can be done in a cherry-picking fashion with no set limit on the number of
overbuilders." CABLEVISION, July 20, 1987, at 20.
117. See Hazlett, supra note 83, at 1357; Nadel, CIOMCAR: A Marketplace Cable
Television Franchise Structure, 20 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 541, 547 (1983). See generally
Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL. J. ECON. 22 (1971).
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because regulation of cable television rates is substantially
eliminated under the Cable Act,l18 the regulatory tools needed
to control a natural monopolist do not exist. Finally, regulation
ignores the view that a realistic threat of entry, not rate regula-
tion, more effectively responds to rate increases or poor
service.
119
2. Problems in Determining Subadditivity
Studies that predict the viability of overbuilds must base
their opinions on various assumptions. There are several diffi-
culties as to the reasonableness of these assumptions, not be-
cause of the economic analysis, but because of the way cable
markets are defined. These difficulties may make it impossible
ever to conclude whether a specific cable franchise territory in-
evitably involves subadditive conditions.
In the cable area, the standard of subadditivity confuses econ-
omies of scale with economies of density.' ° The boundaries of
a franchise territory are not set by market forces. They are
political, set at the outer ends by a city's jurisdictional bounda-
ries. Subadditivity may exist only because the size of a political
territory forces a franchisee to operate beyond, or short of, effi-
cient parameters.-2 ' Market forces define the ideal service area
with geographic, and not political, parameters.' 22
118. Implementation of the Provisions of the Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984, Report & Order, MM Docket No. 84-1296, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,637, 18,653 (1985)
[hereinafter "Implementation"], aff'd in part, ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554 (D.C. Cir.
1987), implementing 47 U.S.C. § 543(b) (Supp. III 1985).
119. See supra note 87.
120. See Hazlett, supra note 83, at 1364 n.104: "Strictly speaking, economies of den-
sity are a distinct type of economies of scale. Density economies are scale economies
where volume is measured on a per mile or per number of homes passed basis rather
than on an absolute size standard."
121. Furthermore, the Cable Act may require cities to insure that even uneco-
nomic wiring occurs. 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(3) (Supp. III 1985) requires franchising au-
thorities to "assure that access to cable service is not denied to any group of potential
residential cable subscribers because of the income of the residents of the local area in
which such group resides." This provision is designed to insure that operators do not
engage in "redlining" of poorer areas. H.R. Rep. No. 98-934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 59
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEwS 4655, 4696. Research has
not revealed any published studies indicating whether cable system profitability is
related to the income level of the area served. However, to the extent such areas do
exist, § 541(a)(3) becomes an additional market distortion. See Century Fed., Inc. v.
City of Palo Alto, 63 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1736, 1740 (1987).
122. For example, the city-ordered studies referred to in supra notes 98-102 are
tied to particular political boundaries; a market-based &ivision might show that cost
conditions are not subadditive. The statement in the text refers to interstate rather
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The definition of the territory is not only distorted by bound-
aries set by the parameters of a city, but also by the inability of
cities to grant franchises in adjacent areas outside their sphere
of influence. Systems operating in adjacent jurisdictions or
contiguous internal territories might find it economically sensi-
ble to overbuild into a neighboring territory. Without franchis-
ing, they could do so. For instance, in 1985 the Department of
Justice refused to challenge consolidation of overbuilt and adja-
cent Phoenix cable systems because consolidation might in-
crease productive efficiency.1 a2
Density variations within a franchise territory make it diffi-
cult to say whether or not competition is viable, on the whole,
posing another difficulty in determining subaddivity. Whether
overbuilding makes sense turns on the intensity of demand rel-
ative to the cost per mile of cable and the marginal cost per
subscriber. Myriad factors, which often change block by block
in a neighborhood, influence these variables. Adequacy of
over-the-air reception, desirability of satellite programs, 24 and
availability of substitutes for cable'm are a few of the variables
that influence demand intensity.
Cost per mile of cable, or economies of density, depend on
terrain and population. One 1987 study indicates that, in order
to have profits from a complete overbuild, there must be about
110 houses per mile or about 90 houses per mile with very poor
reception of over-the-air broadcast signals.126 Thus, according
than international boundaries. In the latter case, tariffs or politics could affect mar-
ket efficiency;, short of a tariff-free world, those geopolitical limitations remain. Inter-
national boundaries could be affected by tariffs or the view, universally held, that
cable service must be locally authorized. Unlike newspapers, videos or even broad-
casters (whose signals may cross borders), cable operators have been subject to local
regulation. Foreigners may own local cable systems. D. BRENNER & M. PRICE, supra
note 5, at § 4.04[3J.
123. Dept. of Justice, Press Release, Apr. 1, 1985. See Discussion Paper, supra note
113, at 5-6. The market solution in these cases is for one adjacent system to buy out
the other or for two operators to trade adjacent systems owned in locations, permit-
ting consolidation. See Kahn, Cablevision Pays Premium in Viacom Dea4 CABLEVI-
SION, August 29, 1988, at 16, 20 (consolidation of adjacent Long Island, N.Y. systems).
Even where systems are separately owned, operators often join together to form "in-
terconnects" so that local advertising spots on satellite networks like CNN can be sold
marketwide, in competition with local broadcasters.
124. One example might be homes with specific language requirements. A non-
English speaking household may be more inclined toward foreign language program-
ming available via satellite or a local independent broadcaster not carried on cable.
125. For discussion of substitutes for cable, see isfira notes 135-45 and accompany-
ing text.
126. MULTiCHANNEL NEws, Apr. 13, 1987, at 17, col. 1 (citing Malarkey-Taylor Re-
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to this study, the critical mass, the point at which a given terri-
tory ceases to be subadditive, may be present in some, but not
all, parts of a franchise territory.' 17 Marginal cost also turns on
billing procedures, marketing efforts, as well as physical plant
costs. Factors such as managerial expertise, capital market
conditions, and construction technology' 2 may also play a part.
Another problem in determining true subadditivity arises be-
cause the most likely overbuild candidate, the local telephone
company, is forbidden from being a cable operator under the
Cable Act'2 and was excluded by prior FCC rule.1 30 While the
twisted copper wires comprising the current sunk costs of the
local phone network lack sufficient bandwidth to carry cable
television service, new plant or upgrades to systems of fiber op-
tic cables are capable of providing a competitive transmission
path to coaxial cable. Once fiber optic systems are built, and
their costs become sunk, only government regulation will pre-
vent competition.'13  Whether or not there are independent rea-
search, Economic Analysis of Cable System Overbuilds, Jan. 1987 (unpublished study
for Times Mirror Cable TV)). The 1987 Touche, Ross & Co. Metro Dade Report,
supra note 102, at 32, indicated that overbuilder Telesat Cablevision, the Florida
Power and Light subsidiary, would lose up to $138 million over a 10 year period, were
it to overbuild the county's existing 240,000 subscribers.
127. For example, a residential development might have higher density town-
houses and lower density one-acre tracts. Overbuilding might be profitable in the
townhouse community but not the larger homesites. Were the two separated as dis-
tinct cable districts, one might expect overbuilding in the first part but not the latter.
128. Cable system operating costs vary with improvements in technology. For ex-
ample, fiber optic transmission systems afford lower maintenance costs, fewer service
outages and improved signal quality, even though original construction costs are
higher than coaxial wire. Over time, these costs may minimize significant differences
on the economies of density. Further, because cable is a system of hubs feeding to
trunk lines and thereafter to feeder and drop lines to the homes, distant-insensitive
technologies like microwave can further reduce the apparent high costs of low-density
wiring. See Dawson, Fiber Systems Proliferate As Interest Grows, CABLEVISION, Apr.
11, 1988, at 38.
129. 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (Supp. III 1985), codfying 47 C.F.R. § 63.54(a) (1984).
130. 47 C.F.R. § 63.54 (1988) maintains the cross-ownership rule and a waiver pol-
icy for telephone company provision of cable service in rural areas. The FCC "tenta-
tively" decided to recommend to Congress that it repeal the 1984 ownership bar and
consider liberalizing its standards for affiliation between cable and telephone compa-
nies and for cross-ownership waivers. CABLE TV L. RPm, July 26, 1988, at 1.
131. Telephone companies may lease space on their lines to cable operators, but
they may not operate cable systems themselves. Sometimes this results in the tele-
phone company building a coaxial system for a cable operator. Telephone companies
may provide facilities for unaffiliated cable systems. See, eg., In re Matter of Wiscon-
sin Bell, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 56 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1262, para. 1
(1984). One telephone company, Southern Bell, believes that a fiber optic system is
cost effective even without a cable lessee. CABLEVISION, Sep. 28, 1987, at 16. With
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sons for the continued bar to telephone entry in the cable
business,3 2 it is hard to insist on the existence of a natural
monopoly given the large shadow cast by this outlawed
competitor.
In addition, a finding of natural monopoly depends on identi-
fying a "product" whose output can be controlled by the sole
provider and for which there are no substitutes.133 Substitutes
for cable exist, but there is disagreement as to whether they are
complete substitutes.1 4 It depends on how one defines the
market of services cable provides.
An important substitute arises when cable franchise areas
contain unaffiliated satellite master antenna systems (SMATV)
serving multiple dwelling units.' In a SMATV arrangement,
property developers or landlords install a satellite receiving
dish and master antenna system in an apartment building and
offer "private" cable, carrying cable satellite network and
broadcast signals taken from the satellite dish and conventional
TV antenna to residents."' Because no rights-of-way are in-
volved, no franchise is required.13 Cable companies object to
such systems in place, it will be easier for a telephone company to launch a competi-
tive service to cable, if permitted.
132. In the triennial review of the consent decree covering divestiture of AT&T
and the entry of former Bell Operating Companies into new ventures, the district
court denied those companies the right to enter the information services business di-
rectly. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 587-99 (D.D.C. 1987). But
see Noam, supra note 107. The National Telecommunications and Information Ad-
ministration (NTIA) recommends telephone companies be permitted to offer a video
dial tone, offering carriage but no origination function. NTIA, VIDEO PROGRAM DIs-
TRIBUTION AND CABLE TELEVISION: CURRENT POLIcY ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS,
Report No. 88-233 (1988). See also In re Application of General Tel. Co. of Cal., 64
RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1156, pars. 42 (1988) (granting waiver of cable-telephone com-
pany cross ownership restriction in Cerritos, California to construct broadband trans-
port facility because system "demonstrably could not exist" without operator's
affiliation with the telephone company).
133. Two products are considered substitutes if they are reasonably interchangea-
ble, "price, use and qualities considered." United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours &
Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956). The Department of Justice maintains merger guidelines
to determine when two products are good substitutes in connection with a proposed
merger between two competitors. See Schockro, Mergers and Acquisitions, in ANTI-
TRUST ADVmOR 161, 217 (C. Hills 3d ed. 1985).
134. Compare Hazlett, supra note 83, at 1387-1400 with Comment, supra note 92, at
636-47.
135. D. BRENNER & M. PRIMC, see supra note 5, at ch. 13.
136. Earth Satellite Communications, Inc., 95 F.C.C.2d 1223, paras. 1,8 (1983), aff'd
sub non. New York Comm'n on Cable Television v. FCC, 749 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
137. AL
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this competition in their franchise area and may in fact try to
"overbuild" those buildings.'-"
Such scattershot competition in apartment areas belies the
notion that a cable service is a natural monopoly in a given ter-
ritory, even though two full-service cable systems might be eco-
nomically infeasible. But SMATV is not a complete substitute.
A franchise territory of apartment complexes may find
SMATV a full substitute to cable service for both over-the-air
and satellite delivered signals; but a single-family housing com-
munity may not, because each home would need its own dish
and the equipment to combine over-the-air and satellite signals
on one tuner,139 a service more efficiently done by cable at its
headend.140
Nor are broadcast signals a complete substitute. The FCC
found that the cable industry is generally subject to "effective
competition," the standard set forth in the Cable Act to elimi-
nate cable rate regulation.141 This "competition," however, re-
fers to the provision of over-the-air signals, as opposed to
satellite cable services." Under the FCC's definition, an esti-
mated eighty-four percent of subscribers enjoy such effective
competition. 43  However, cable is desirable for other services
138. In Cox Cable San Diego, Inc. v. Bookspan, 195 Cal. App. 3d 22, 240 Cal. Rptr.
407 (4th Dist. 1987), a cable system claimed that its exclusion from an apartment
building in favor of a SMATV operator selected by the landlord violated the first
amendment. The state court of appeals concluded that the cable operator had no
right of access to the tenants' dwellings. The cases did not address the question of
whether a tenant who desired the Cox Cable service over the SMATV service pro-
vided by the landlord would have a right to receive it under the first amendment.
Accord Wilco Elec. Sys. v. Davis, No. 02307 (Pa. Super. June 8, 1988), reported at
CABLE TV L. RPTR., June 30, 1988, at 6.
139. Hazlett, supra note 83, at 1391.
140. See supra note 5.
141. 47 U.S.C. § 543 (b)(1) (Supp. III 1985). Prior to the Act the FCC determined
that rate regulation of nonbasic cable television service was unnecessary and pre-
empted local efforts to do so in order to promote development of national program
service. Clarification of Cable Television Rules, 46 F.C.C.2d 175, 186 (1974), qff'd sub
nom. Brookhaven Cable TV v. Kelly, 573 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
904 (1979).
142. Cable systems are subject to effective competition where there are at least
three broadcast TV signals that cover 100 percent of the homes or are "significantly
viewed" in the cable system's community. 64 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1276 (1988). The
original definition allowed the three signals to cover "any portion" of the franchise
territory. Implementation, supra note 118, at 18,653. The FCC revised its ruling after
the D.C. Circuit found the definition arbitrary and capricious. ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d
1554, 1572 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
143. "When the rules were first adopted, NCTA estimated that seventy-five per-
cent of all cable systems serving ninety percent of all cable subscribers would be de-
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with which over-the-air broadcasting cannot compete, such as
premium and basic satellite channels, making broadcast signals
an incomplete substitute.
The other technologies often cited to fill out the picture of
the competitive video marketplace-over-the-air subscription
TV, medium power or high power direct broadcast satellites,
multichannel multipoint distribution service,'144 and videocas-
sette outlets--also are imperfect substitutes. No one of these
services offers the range of local and satellite services and con-
venience of cable. Still, their presence, taken together, tends to
mitigate the concern that a customer is without alternatives1
45
if dissatisfied with cable programming. 14e
Given the conflicting data and theories concerning cable tele-
vision as a natural monopoly, there is no reason to expect much
certainty to arise from any trial held to determine whether
competition is viable in a particular community. One response
to this conundrum is to conclude that it is better to let would-be
entrants make the decision to enter. 47 This would avoid the
questionable economic policy in which "self-interested business
regulated. After the court decision, it said that systems serving six percent of all cable
subscribers would have the return of regulation as a result." BROADCASTING, Mar. 28,
1988, at 36.
144. D. BRENNER & M. PRICE, supra note 5, at § 16.04. An exhaustive list of alter-
natives to the various services offered by cable in addition to video is provided in Jack-
son, supra note 1, at 155-64.
145. A customer who needs cable for over-the-air reception of local broadcast sig-
nals has no alternative but to subscribe. Under these circumstances, the FCC allows
franchisors to continue to regulate the rates of the operator. See supra note 141. In
that way, the franchisor can theoretically hold the operator accountable for inade-
quate service. In some areas, customer service is less than admirable. Problems in-
clude unanswered phone calls, haphazardly scheduled service calls, and outages
during popular pay-per-view events. Customers may prefer an improved cable system
to switching to one of the competing technologies. Telephone survey of selected Fal-
con Cable customers, Aug. 1987.
146. It also tends to weaken the argument that cable television is like water, tele-
phone, or power services, for which universal service is generally viewed as a social
necessity. On the other hand, a franchising authority must ensure that cable televi-
sion is not denied to a group of potential subscribers due to their income. See, e.g., 47
U.S.C. § 541(a)(3) (Supp. 1111985). Even if essential, it does not follow that it is desira-
ble to have a single provider. But see supra note 82.
147. Judge Posner, in Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d
119 (7th Cir. 1982), suggested that "[i]f the most efficient method of determining
which firm should have the natural monopoly is a competitive process that will inevi-
tably destroy the other firms, the antitrust laws presumably would forbid interfer-
ence with that process." Id. at 127. He went on to suggest, however, that if a city
wishes to spare consumers "a competitive free-for-all," it may do so. Id. In Omega,
the court declined to grant an injunction based on first amendment and Sherman Act
claims against a city's grant of an exclusive franchise, concluding that "[t]here is no
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persons, risking their own dollars and reputations, are [seen as]
less able to recognize ruinous competition than city council
members who do not directly realize any profit or loss. '1 4  As-
suming that the potential entrant is not seeking entry only to
be bought out later, there is considerable merit to assigning the
choice of whether to enter to the party who will suffer for a bad
judgment. On the other hand, a city may be concerned that
free entry would reduce the quality of service provided by the
ultimate winner or discourage the best operators from
applying.se
Whether competitive entry is more or less desirable as a mat-
ter of policy, the question left by Preferred is different. If a city
decides to grant an exclusive franchise, claiming natural mo-
nopoly as a basis, Preferred holds that the city's assumption
must have evidentiary support. Evidence as to economies of
density, demand for cable service, and other measurements dis-
cussed earlier are relevant. But even with such evidence, as the
foregoing conflicting studies and definitional pitfalls show, a
"finding" of a natural monopoly is likely to be a decision
fraught with serious shortcomings. Moreover, this determina-
tion is to be made by the jury, which may be inclined to take a
"monopoly, shmonopoly" approach to the question and seek
some other basis on which to decide the propriety of
overbuilding.1
5 1
precedent for condemning an exclusive franchise in these circumstances, at least out
of hand." Id
148. Hazlett, supra note 83, at 1351. Hazlett cites the cost of municipal regulation,
the use of "rent-a-citizens" and other abuses of the franchising process, the delays
caused by auctions, and the inferiority of political choice displacing consumer choice
in arguing for open competition in cable. Id. at 1351-64.
149. There was this suggestion in the jury's Nor-West verdict. See infra note 151.
150. These considerations, which seem as imponderable by a reviewing court as
classifying a market as a "natural monopoly," are summed up by Victor Goldberg-
"Would the firm have come into the market initially without some protection from
competition? Would it have come in on terms as favorable as it did? What will be the
rate of supply of innovations in the future if potential suppliers realize they will not
be protected by the regulator?" Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7
BELL J. ECON. 426, 435 (1976). See also J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND
DEMOCRACY 88 (1950).
151. Two of the reported cases where a finding on natural monopoly was reached
support this conclusion. In Pacific West Cable Co. v. City of Sacramento, 672 F. Supp.
1322 (E.D. Cal. 1987), the jury found that cable television was not a natural monopoly
in the Sacramento market. Id at 1349. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. In
Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 891 (W.D. Mo.
1985), off'd, 800 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 1358 (1987), the court
decided that the existence of a natural monopoly was a question of fact, not law.
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C. Right to Control Rights-of-Way
The remaining issue-52 on remand in Preferred arises from
the Court's statement that "[t]he City... justifies the limit on
franchises in terms of minimizing the demand that cable sys-
tems make for the use of public property."1- While the precise
contours of this government interest are not discernible, the is-
sue concerns the City's claim that it may act to control rights-
of-way so as to best benefit the public.'" This issue is not pri-
marily a question of fact, but a matter of law.
It is in the nature of a representative form of government
that a city should operate as a trustee for the people.155 Re-
sponsibility for property held in trust by the city allows a city to
regulate access to streets by cable based on what it perceives to
be the best interests of its people. The city may concern itself
with which system of franchising leads to the best price/value
ratio15 However, it may choose noneconomic objectives as
Here, the jury proceeded to find that a natural monopoly existed in the franchise
territory. 610 F. Supp. at 901 n.33. There, too, extenuating circumstances existed, Le.,
anti-competitive conduct by the incumbent franchisee. Id. at 903. This led to a $32.4
million judgment on the antitrust claim and, in the alternative, $35.8 million on a
state law claim.
In the third case, Nor-West Cable Communications Partnership v. City of St. Paul,
3-83 Civ. 1228 (D. Minn. June 10, 1988), reported at CABLE TV L. RPTR., June 30, 1988,
at 3-5, a jury decided that there was insufficient demand to support more than one
cable television company in St. Paul. There is at least the suggestion that the jury did
not believe that Nor-West, the potential overbuilder, was actually interested in build-
ing a system. Four of the special verdicts indicated that the jury did not find that Nor-
West had the financial or technical capability to construct a system in competition
with the incumbent operator.
152. Other issues, not specifically identified in the Preferred decisions, may also
come up at trial as other "competing societal interests" of importance to the City of
Los Angeles. Preferred, 476 U.S. 488,495 (1986), off'g on narrower grounds, 754 F.2d
1396 (9th Cir. 1985). These might include how an application furthers the city's mi-
nority business enterprise policies or whether an applicant complies with its ban
against doing business with entities that do business with South Africa.
153. Preferred, 476 U.S. at 493.
154. Id at 492, 495.
155. The first portion of the well-known words of Justice Roberts in Hague v. CIO
apply: "Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public." 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
156. R. POsNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 361-62 (3d ed. 1986). The city acting
as agent for the residents could solicit bids, setting as its goal the best possible contract
for its subscribers. This differs from the current arrangement described by Judge
Posner as one "to extract concessions from the franchisee as the price of permitting it
to charge a monopoly price." Id. at 361. One of the difficulties Professor Hazlett
seemed to face in his review of natural monopoly and cable is the lack of a condemna-
tion of cable regulation in Posner's writings, to which he accords considerable weight.
Hazlett, supra note 83, at 1348-51. In particular, he relies on Judge Posner's critique
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well, such as a desire to enhance diversity157 through franchis-
ing conditions relating to access, access studios, and channel ca-
pacity, even though those choices may not be based on market
demand.158 Some cities are so concerned that cable television
meet their community's expectations that they construct their
own systems. 59
A city is empowered to make these choices because the oper-
ator has sought a privilege essential to engaging in its particular
business, a privilege not sought by SMATV, over-the-air TV, or
direct broadcast satellite operators, for instance.'60 First, it
desires nontransient use of poles and ducts to carry on its busi-
ness. Unlike the transient uses of streets made by newspa-
pers,"' cable's use of city facilities is more akin to leasing a city-
owned warehouse or other facility. But government's involve-
ment is even greater than with a leased warehouse because the
poles and ducts are often privately owned, yet they must be
made available to the operator at government-regulated ratesl6 2
by the cable operator's likeliest overbuilders-the telephone
and power companies.6 3
of natural monopoly, with extensive quotation of Posner's views in Omega Satellite
Products, 694 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1982); see supra note 147. While sending mixed signals
in his opinion, Posner ultimately suggests that some entry regulation of cable may be
possible. Omega Satellite Products, 694 F.2d at 128.
157. Diversity, measured by either ownership of media or resulting viewpoints, is a
sustainable basis for content-neutral regulation. See FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for
Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1981) (permitting newspaper-broadcast station cross-own-
ership bar to increase diversity); see also Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1,
20 (1944); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 385, 390 (1969). The Cable
Act established one of its purposes as assuring "that cable communications provide
and are encouraged to provide the widest possible diversity of information sources and
services to the public." 47 U.S.C. § 521(4) (Supp. III 1985).
158. The presence of public broadcasting in the United States assumes the absence
of market demand sufficient to support its programming in the commercial market-
place. See Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60
TEx. L. REV. 207, 250-55 (1982).
159. See supra note 20.
160. It is not an insignificant privilege. In California, for instance, the statutory
scheme provides that cities are authorized to prescribe the conditions by which that
use may occur. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 53066, 53066.1(a)(4).
161. Cf. Cox Cable San Diego, Inc. v. Bookspan, 195 Cal. App. 3d 22, 240 Cal. Rptr.
407 (4th Dist. 1987) (cable operator displaced by SMATV operator has no first amend-
ment right of access to former customer tenants; court distinguished newspaper's
transitory trespass of private property with cable's nontransient use). See also City of
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 108 S. Ct. 2138, 2155 n.6 (1988) (White, J.,
dissenting) (distinguishing transient versus nontransient use of sidewalk as a basis for
regulating newsracks).
162. 47 U.S.C. § 224(b)(1) (1982).
163. One commentator compares the use of poles and ducts and acquisition of
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Second, an operator, through its franchise, is empowered to
acquire easements for and between property that would other-
wise have to be negotiated with each property owner involved.
The city makes available to the franchisee its power of eminent
domain to engage in this taking.1 ' The franchise gives the op-
erator access to property of the utility pole and duct owners, as
noted earlier, as well as to the property of homeowners.
Although a token fee may be involved as payment for the
use,'" without the franchise the operator would have to bear
the high, potentially imponderable, transactional costs of such
arrangements.l6
The Court's suggested factual inquiry about how a franchisee
is selected to enjoy rights-of-way may adduce some illicit mo-
tive in the approach taken by a city. It can serve to check well-
meaning, but content-related, bases for franchising as well. But
beyond these subjects, and generally testing the sincerity of the
franchising officials, there is little that a factual presentation
about rights-of-way will prove. Either the city is granting these
benefits to operators or it is not. If it is, then the city's justifica-
tion as cast by the Court has been established, and the city's
franchising behavior should be judged by the standards appro-
priate to economic, not speech, regulation.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court's decision in Preferred 167 to seek a more
rights-of-way by the cable operator to the ordinary telephone user's use of the same
facilities. Schildhause, Preferred Communications: Preamble to Breakup of Local
Cable Franchising?, 7 PACE L. REv. 1, 13 n.46 (1986). However, comparison of the
operator to the telephone company is more appropriate, since in both instances the
entities are seeking nontransient use to operate communications businesses. The tele-
phone user is a customer who does not directly profit from the grant of the facilities.
164. (Y: DeVon-Aire Villas Homeowners Ass'n, No. 4, Inc. v. Americable Assocs.,
Ltd., 490 So. 2d 60, 62-63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
165. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
166. A series of homeowner hold-outs might make access to some homes difficult
or impossible. The granting of easements differentiates the cable operator from the
SMATV operator, who must negotiate with the landlord for the rights to service the
building involved. Operators seeking to serve private residential developments obtain
easements by express conveyance from the developer for these rights. Easements for
cable may then be included in the documents of title when the property is conveyed to
the homeowner. See, e.g., 10 CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE LAW AND PRACTICE § 343.151]
(1988).
167. 476 U.S. 488 (1986), off V on narrower grounds, 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985).
The City of Los Angeles had appealed the case to the Court in the first instance, but
the appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction and the papers were treated as a
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thorough record, and thereby say as little as possible, before
deciding on a first amendment regime for cable television was
unavoidable. The Court-ordered trial of issues, dimly desig-
nated by either the Ninth Circuit or the Court, is unlikely to
resolve much. The questions posed about esthetics, traffic de-
lays, and natural monopoly are not necessarily beyond the deci-
sion-making capabilities of a jury. But a decisive showing on
any of these questions is unlikely. Dubious clarifications will
little aid the trial judge in deciding whether the first amend-
ment has been violated.
A Preferred-mandated trial could bring up facts more rele-
vant to the first amendment, i.e., viewpoint discrimination
against a would-be franchisee; but this result, too, is unlikely.
Other nefarious behavior, entirely unrelated to the first
amendment interests but wrongs nonetheless, may emerge.
Alternatively, the factual findings now required by Preferred
may cause franchising authorities to consider more carefully
the heretofore almost universal policy of exclusive licensing.
Given the pressures that will result from potential
overbuilders, possibly including the telephone companies, this
reexamination may be quite timely. But an understanding of
the first amendment aspects of cable franchising will not be
much advanced.
Absent evidence of suppression of viewpoint in the franchis-
ing process, the act of seeking a franchise under the 1984 Cable
Act should not be characterized as an exercise of speech under
the first amendment, nor should denial be deemed a violation
of that constitutional protection. For a variety of reasons, the
Court was not ready to reach this conclusion in Preferred. The
unfortunate result is the essentially dead-end route which this
and similar litigation must now travel.
certiorari petition. Perhaps the Court viewed it as a mistake to have granted the peti-
tion for writ of certiorari, given the brevity and nondecisiveness of its opinion. Profes-
sor Powe's view of the decision suggests as much: "In short--indeed in what for the
current Court is a spectacularly short opinion-the Court ducked." L. POWE, JR.,
supra note 17, at 243.
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